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INTRODUCTION
For many years equity interest owners in closely held entities have
engaged in buy-sell agreements. Buy-sell agreements provide for,
among other things, restrictions on the transfer of equity interests upon
the occurrence of certain triggering events such as the death, disability,
or retirement of an equity holder. Parties to buy-sell agreements experi-
ence varying income and estate tax consequences depending on the type
of agreement, form of business entity associated with the agreement, the
manner in which an equity holder's interest is transferred, and the source
of the funds that are used to purchase the interest. In many cases, an
insurance policy on the life of an equity holder serves as a source for the
funds that will be used to acquire a decedent equity holder's interest
upon his or her death. Though complex, the federal tax consequences to
business entities and equity holders that engage in such buy-sell ar-
rangements have largely been settled.
However, with the advent of the limited liability company (the
"LLC") and with two federal circuit courts of appeal issuing opinions
that impact how estates of deceased corporate shareholders are taxed, the
manner in which estate tax is imposed on transfers subject to certain
common buy-sell arrangements has been called into question.' Further,
an analysis of the policy underlying the applicable sections of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code 2 (the "Code") governing such transactions reveals
very little consistency between the relevant Code sections and applicable
Treasury Regulations. 3 Not surprisingly, there is also little consistency
in the manner in which such sections are applied by the courts and ad-
1. See Estate of Blount v. Comm'r, 428 F.3d 1338, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of
Cartwright, 183 F.3d 1034, 1035 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. All section references to the Code are references to Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as
amended from time to time.
3. See infra Part ll.B. .a.
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ministered by the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS" or the "Ser-
vice").
Current provisions of the Code and regulations have historically
been interpreted to require the value of insurance proceeds received on a
life insurance policy owned by a corporation to be ratably included in the
estate of the insured decedent shareholder via an increase in value stock
of the entity.5 Under this interpretation, a deceased shareholder's gross
estate would reflect a proportionate increase in the value of the stock due
to the company's receipt of the insurance proceeds.
However, the Ninth and recently the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have issued opinions which impact the manner in which stock of a
closely held corporation subject to a buy-sell agreement is valued for
estate tax purposes.6 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal
have held, among other things, that in determining the value of a corpo-
ration for purposes of determining the value of a deceased shareholder's
interest, the value of insurance proceeds received by the corporation
must be offset against the corporation's obligation to redeem the share-
holder's stock under the buy-sell arrangement.7 The holdings remove
the value of insurance proceeds from the value of the corporation which,
in turn, reduces the value of each shareholder's equity interest. While
this interpretation may be logical, it is misplaced in calculating the value
of a shareholder's stock in a redemption transaction for estate tax pur-
poses.
In contravention to the apparent intent of the Code and historical
application of current regulations, the two opinions appear under certain
circumstances to allow the value of insurance proceeds received by a
closely held corporation to completely escape estate taxation. 8 This out-
come thwarts the Code's overall goal of including either all or a portion
of the value of such insurance proceeds in the insured decedent's estate. 9
The opinions are also inconsistent with the IRS's interpretation of its
own regulations that govern the manner in which insurance proceeds
received by a corporation are included in the value of a deceased share-
holder's stock. ' 0
Directly related to the above problem and due to the increased
popularity of limited partnerships and limited liability companies, tax-
payers have increasingly sought to implement buy-sell agreements within
partnership or LLC structures. Although the regulations provide guid-
4. See infra Part I.B. 1.a.iii.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2042; Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(f) (as amended in 2006), 20.2042-
l(c)(6) (as amended in 1979); see also infra Part lI.B.I.a; Part II.B.1 .b.
6. Estate of Blount, 428 F.3d at 1339-40; Estate ofCartwright, 183 F.3d at 1035.
7. 428 F.3d at 1346; 183 F.3d at 1038.
8. See infra Part Il.B. 1 .a.iii.(b).
9. See I.R.C. § 2042(a)(2).
10. See infra Part Il.B. 1.a.iii.(c).
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ance on the tax consequences of insurance proceeds received by a corpo-
ration, no regulatory guidance is available in relation to receipt of insur-
ance proceeds in a partnership structure."l Taxpayers and commentators
are now inquiring as to the tax consequences of the receipt of insurance
proceeds by a limited partnership or limited liability company. Without
guidance from the Treasury on the use of an insurance funded buy-sell
arrangement in an LLC or limited partnership structure, taxpayers and
their advisors are left to interpret a small number of old cases and rulings
to determine the tax consequences of various proposed structures. Fur-
ther, existing rulings by the IRS in the partnership area are inconsistent
with the manner in which the regulations treat corporations and share-
holders under similar circumstances.' 2 Given the increasing number of
closely held companies that are being formed in the United States and the
important business and estate planning goals that are served by such buy-
sell agreements, the tax consequences of such arrangements should be
clarified. 13
In an effort to address these problems, this article first provides an
overview of the manner in which buy-sell arrangements are structured
with a specific focus on using insurance proceeds to fund the arrange-
ment. 14 The article reviews the historical manner in which corporations
and shareholders who are parties to buy-sell agreements are taxed where
the agreement is funded by life insurance proceeds. 15 An argument is
made that the recent holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeal inappropriately allow taxpayers to exclude all of the value of
insurance proceeds payable to a closely held corporation from the gross
estate of a deceased shareholder. 16
The article then analyzes the application of the Code, regulations,
and rulings applicable to the receipt by partnerships and LLCs of insur-
ance proceeds of a policy on the life of a member of partner where a buy-
11. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
12. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39034 (Sept. 21, 1983), available at 1983 GCM
LEXIS 83,*1-2; Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
13. For data and statistics on the increasing number of LLC formations over the last several
years see TaxProf Blog, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/govtreports/index.htm which
shows the following statistical graphic that compares the cumulative increase in LLC formations to
formations of corporations in several large states:
Cumulative +/- 2005 2004 2003 2002
State LLC Corp LLC Corp LLC Corp LLC Corp LLC Corp
CA 87.1% 20.1% 70,024 107,923 58,097 103,325 45,274 93,696 37,429 89,880
FL 237.9% 23.7% 130,558 175,698 100,070 177,490 62,406 168,080 38,639 142,036
NY 72.1% (11.4%) 58,847 82,300 47,967 84,434 40,768 83,273 34,193 92,929
OH 60.3% (18.5%) 42,594 14,921 38,765 16,386 31,147 16,601 26,575 18,299
PA 109.6% 4.6% 27,885 23,107 23,752 23,156 16,472 20,943 13,302 22,096
TX 81.3% (27.3 %) 59,076 40,945 49,677 42,302 35,285 55,107 32.593 56.319
The above graphic was synthesized by Larry Ribstein from data obtained from the International
Association of Commercial Administrators, Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/
05/the data is out.html.
14. See infra Part 1.
15. See infra Part 1I.
16. See infra Part ll.B. 1.
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sell agreement is in place. 17 The article focuses on areas in which the
cases, rulings, statutes, and regulations either inaccurately or inade-
quately provide guidance to taxpayers. A conclusion is reached that the
guidance in relation to corporations is inconsistent with treatment ac-
corded to partners of partnerships and members of LLCs. In this regard,
the article proposes that the regulations applicable to corporations, with
suggested amendments, should apply to limited liability companies and
limited partnerships in the same manner as they apply to corporations.' 8
Finally, the article questions whether the case precedents and regu-
lations now in force protect the overall goals of the Code as originally
enacted by Congress.19 The author concludes that the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeal's recent decision is arguably inaccurate. At the same
time, the author acknowledges the ambiguities in the current regulations
as interpreted by the Courts of Appeal and proposes amendments that
will assist courts and taxpayers in interpreting them. The amendments, if
adopted, seek to clarify the regulations to make them consistent with the
intent of the Code and apply equally to corporations and entities that are
treated as partnerships for tax purposes.
I. OVERVIEW OF BUY-SELL ARRANGEMENTS
A buy-sell agreement is a contract pursuant to which a corporate
shareholder, partner, or member of an LLC may (or must) offer his or her
equity interest for sale to the company or the other equity holders upon
the occurrence of certain triggering events. 20  Triggering events may
include, among others, the equity holder's death, disability, retirement, or
termination.
A buy-sell arrangement generally restricts the sale or transfer of an
ownership interest in the entity to certain related parties or unrelated par-
ties in general. For example, the equity holders of a closely held entity
may wish to limit future ownership to individual family members who
are perceived as capable of participating in management and operations
of the entity. The terms of a buy-sell agreement also may include a
method for determining a price for a unit of interest in an entity. By lim-
iting ownership and setting a method of valuation, a buy-sell agreement
can provide a method that is acceptable to all the equity holders of trans-
ferring control and continuing the existence of an entity upon the death,
disability, or termination of employment of a single equity holder.
A buy-sell arrangement can create a market for a closely held equity
interest. Without such an arrangement, little, if any, market may exist for
17. See infra Part lI.B. .b.
18. See infra Part 111.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See Jonathan E. Strouse, Redemption and Cross-Purchase Agreements: A Comparison,
THE PRACTICAL ACCOUNTANT, Oct. 1991, at 44.
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an interest in a closely held entity. With a buy-sell arrangement in place,
a minority interest in a closely held company may be transferred to other
equity holders, family members or redeemed by the company. A buy-
sell agreement will often set the price for the purchase.
A buy-sell agreement can also provide a source of funds upon a
purchase or redemption of a deceased shareholder's ownership interest.
For example, where a corporation, partnership, or LLC becomes a party
to a buy-sell agreement and is required under certain circumstances to
purchase the interest of an equity holder, the company may be authorized
under the arrangement to purchase life insurance on each of the equity
holders in order to fund the purchase of a deceased equity holder's inter-
est. In the event the equity holder passes away, the entity will receive the
insurance proceeds and use such proceeds to purchase the decedent's
equity interest from his or her estate.
Of course, buy-sell arrangements differ in structure and form. The
two most common forms of buy-sell agreements are cross-purchase
agreements and redemption agreements. 2' The two structures result in
different federal income and estate tax consequences to the entity and its
equity holders. Depending on the facts and circumstances, the equity
holders of an entity will select the structure that is most efficient from an
economic, management, income, and estate tax perspective. This section
initially focuses on the form of typical structures that use insurance pro-
ceeds to fund buy-sell agreements and then analyzes federal tax conse-
quences of each of the basic structures.
A. Cross-Purchase Agreements
A cross-purchase agreement is a contract among the equity holders
of a company. Under the terms of a cross-purchase agreement, each eq-
uity holder agrees or has an option to purchase some or all of the stock
offered by the other equity holders.22 The corporation, partnership, or
LLC is typically not a party to a cross-purchase agreement. In a cross-
purchase arrangement, the remaining equity holders must purchase, for
example, another equity holder's interest upon a triggering event (e.g.,
death).
In a cross-purchase arrangement, each equity holder is authorized to
acquire an insurance policy on the lives of each of the other equity hold-
ers. 23 Each shareholder pays the premiums on the policies that he or she
has acquired on the lives of the other equity holders. Upon the death of
21. There are also variants on these two basic forms of the agreements that may include,
among others, agreements between companies and their equity holders under which the equity
holder may offer his or her interest initially to the company and thereafter to the other equity holders.
Alternatively, the equity holder may first offer his or her interest to the other equity holders and
thereafter to the company.
22. Strouse, supra note 20, at 44.
23. See, e.g., id. at 44-45.
[Vol. 84:2
2006] ESTATE TAXATION OFREDEMPTIONAGREEMENTS 497
an insured equity holder, the surviving equity holder will receive the life
insurance proceeds as beneficiary on the policy ensuring the life of the
decedent equity holder. 24 The surviving equity holders will then use the
insurance proceeds to satisfy their obligation under the cross-purchase
agreement to acquire the deceased equity holder's interest.
1. Tax Consequences to the Selling Equity Holder
There are a number of income and estate tax consequences to the
equity holders in a cross-purchase agreement which differ depending
upon whether the company is a C corporation, S corporation, or an entity
treated as a partnership for tax purposes (e.g., a general partnership, lim-
ited partnership or LLC). Generally, there are no material tax conse-
quences to the company when a cross-purchase agreement is executed
and equity interests are exchanged among the equity holders under the
terms of the agreement.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the estate will receive a basis step
up to fair market value in relation to the deceased shareholder's stock.25
Where insurance proceeds are used to fund a cross purchase obligation,
the remaining shareholders use the policy proceeds to purchase a de-
ceased shareholder's equity interest from the decedent's estate. Corpo-
rate stock generally fits into the definition of a capital asset.26 Thus, any
gain recognized on the sale of the corporate stock is generally subject to
the lower tax rates applicable to capital gains.27 Under these circum-
stances, when the remaining shareholders purchase the decedent's equity
interest at fair market value from decedent's estate, the estate receives
the stock with a basis equal to its fair market value and the estate will not
28realize any gain upon the death of the decedent.
The receipt of the insurance proceeds by the remaining shareholders
will not be included in deceased shareholder's estate unless the estate
held incidents of ownership in the policy. 29 Where the remaining share-
holders own the policies, the remaining shareholders should have all
incidents of ownership in the policy insuring decedent's life. Neither the
decedent nor the decedent's estate should hold incidents of ownership as
contemplated under Code section 2042.
24. Id. at 45.
25. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1). There is an exception to the above in relation to a shareholder of an S
corporation. The estate of a deceased S corporation shareholder will not receive a step up in the
basis to fair market value upon the shareholder's death to the extent of the shareholder's interest in
unrealized receivables of the corporation.
26. I.R.C. § 1221. An exception exists where the shareholder is a "dealer" in stock.
27. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 1222, 1223.
28. This conclusion assumes that there was not a meaningful change in the value of the stock
between the time that the decedent shareholder died and the time that the estate sells the stock to the
remaining shareholders. In the event that the value of the stock changes in the interim period, gain
or loss may be realized and recognized by the estate.
29. See I.R.C. § 2042.
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The tax consequences to a selling partner or member of an LLC
upon the sale of units subject to a cross-purchase agreement are similar
to the tax consequences to a corporate shareholder. Similar to a corpo-
rate shareholder, any gain or loss realized by a partner upon a sale or
exchange of an interest in a partnership or LLC is generally characterized
as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset. Under these circum-
stances, the selling deceased partner or member's estate should experi-
ence a step up in the basis of the ownership interest and realize capital
gain, if any, on the exchange.3'
2. Tax Impact on the Cross-Purchase Buyer
A purchasing shareholder or purchasing partner's initial basis in an
interest acquired from another shareholder or partner is equal to its
cost.3 2  Generally, the cost is equal to fair market value of the equity
interest purchased from decedent's estate. A transfer of a partnership
interest ordinarily will not terminate the partnership unless fifty percent
or more of the total interest in capital and profits is sold or exchanged in
a twelve-month period. 3
3. Drawbacks of the Cross-Purchase Agreement
One drawback of the cross-purchase agreement exists when there
are a large number of equity holders that are parties to the buy-sell ar-
rangement. If, for instance, there are just two equity holders, two life
insurance policies are sufficient; one policy is beneficially owned by A
insuring the life of B and one policy is beneficially owned by B insuring
the life of A. However, when there are a large number of equity holders,
the number of policies required may become impractical. The number of
policies required is equal to i (the number of equity holders) multiplied
by (i - 1).34  For example, if a company has 6 equity holders, the num-
ber of required insurance policies would be 30 [calculated as follows: 6 x
(6-1)]. Under these circumstances, the cost and administrative burden of
managing the policies may become problematic. For this and various
other reasons, equity holders may instead structure their buy-sell ar-
rangement as a redemption agreement.
30. I.R.C. § 741.
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1960). Exceptions exist in relation to the above general rules
where the partnership holds specific types of assets. Similar to the rule applicable to the estate of an
S corporation shareholder, the estate of a deceased partner will not receive a step up in the basis to
fair market value upon the partner's death to the extent the value of the interest is decreased by items
of income in respect of a decedent (items of "IRD"). See I.R.C. § 691; see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE
ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 23.04[1] (2006). Items of IRD
include, among other things, certain partnership receivables and the deceased partner's distributive
share of partnership income for the period ending with his death. Id. (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-
02-018 (Oct. 12, 1990)).
32. I.R.C. § 1012.
33. I.R.C. §708(b); see also MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, 15.02[2](d).
34. Strouse, supra note 20, at 45.
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Another practical problem with cross-purchase agreements can arise
when a new shareholder or partner enters into the agreement. The new
shareholder or partner must obtain an insurance policy on the life of each
of the other equity holders.35 Obtaining an insurance policy on an older
shareholder or partner who is in poor health or of advanced age can be
expensive or hard.36
Finally, where insurance proceeds are received under a policy by
remaining shareholders or partners, there is no guaranty that such pro-
ceeds will be used to purchase the decedent shareholder or partner's eq-
uity interest. 37 The proceeds may instead be expended in an unrelated




A redemption agreement is a contract between the equity holders of
the company and the company itself. Under a typical redemption agree-
ment, a corporation, partnership, or LLC agrees to purchase or redeem
stock or units offered by the shareholders, partners, or members. 39 If,
pursuant to the agreement, the company funds the purchase of the equity
interests with proceeds from life insurance, the company generally pur-
chases only one policy on the life of each equity holder. 40 Thus, for ex-
ample, if six equity holders exist, the company need only purchase six
policies.41
One benefit of a redemption agreement is that the premiums will be
paid by the company which may oversee and confirm that the policy is
maintained .42 Since the company pays the premiums on the life insur-
ance policies, the cost of insurance is borne by the shareholders in pro-
portion to their equity interests.
Redemption agreements have specific federal income and estate tax
consequences to the entities and equity holders that engage in such
agreements. The federal income tax consequences to the parties involved
in a corporate redemption agreement depend on whether the entity that is
a party to the agreement is a C corporation, partnership, or LLC treated




39. Strouse, supra note 20, at 45.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 46. If, in the alternative, a cross-purchase structure had been implemented here, the
company would have been required to purchase 30 policies under the formula. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 45.
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as a partnership for tax purposes. The analysis below is intended to
cover the basic federal tax consequences of a redemption agreement.43
1. Tax Impact on Corporation & Shareholders
Implementation of a redemption agreement between a C corporation
and its shareholders requires analysis of whether the distribution of the
insurance proceeds will be treated as a dividend distribution under Code
section 301 or a taxable exchange between the corporation and the
shareholder under section 302. 44 The complexity of sections 301 and
302 generally causes redemption agreements to be viewed as more com-
plex than a cross-purchase buy-sell arrangement which is among only the
shareholders. It can be time consuming and costly to determine the tax
consequences of a corporate distribution.
Upon the death of a shareholder who is a party to a corporate re-
demption agreement, the remaining shareholders may be faced with the
difficult task of determining whether the distribution in redemption is a
dividend or consideration received in sale or exchange. In the event that
the distribution is characterized as a dividend, the remaining equity hold-
ers will receive no step up in the basis of their equity interests upon the
redemption.45
a. Tax Considerations: Sale or Exchange Treatment
A redemption qualifies as a sale or exchange of a shareholder's
stock under four different circumstances: (1) if it is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend, 46 (2) if the distribution is substantially dispro-
portionate with respect to the shareholder,47 (3) if redemption completely
terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation, 48 or (4) the re-
demption is from an unincorporated shareholder and is in partial liquida-
43. For a more exhaustive analysis, see also HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, STRUCTURING BUY-
SELL AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS WITH FORMS ch. 8 (2005).
44. I.R.C. §§ 301, 302.
45. 1.R.C. § 301.
46. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). In general, in order to qualify under § 302(b)(1) as a redemption that
is essentially equivalent to a dividend, the redemption must result in a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313
(1970); see also Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116. For this purpose, the attribution rules of § 318
of the Code apply. Davis, 397 U.S. at 307. In determining whether a reduction in interest is "mean-
ingful," the most significant rights are: (1) the right to vote and thereby exercise control; (2) the
right to participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to share in net
assets upon liquidation. See Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116 (citing Rev. Rul. 81-289, 1981-2
C.B. 82).
47. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). In general, a redemption is substantially disproportionate within the
meaning of § 302(b)(2) if the shareholder's interest in outstanding common voting and nonvoting
common stock after the redemption is less than 80% of the shareholder's interest before the redemp-
tion, and if, after the redemption, the shareholder owns less than 50% of the combined voting power
of all shares. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C).
48. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). In general, a redemption qualifies as a complete termination under §
302(b)(3) if a shareholder's interest terminates all interests in the corporation as a result of the re-
demption. For this purpose, the attribution rules of § 318 of the Code apply. See I.R.C. § 302(c)(2).
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tion of the distributing corporation. 49 To the extent that the distribution
in redemption meets any one of these specific circumstances, the distri-
bution will qualify for capital gains rather than ordinary income treat-
ment. 50 Again, the determination of whether a redemption is a sale or
exchange under Code section 302(b) is complex. A complete discussion
of each of the four circumstances is beyond the scope of this article.'
Nevertheless, classification of a distribution in redemption as a sale or
exchange, as opposed to a dividend, is important primarily because of the
ability of the shareholder to benefit from his or her basis in the shares.
For example, assume A and B are shareholders of C Corp. (which
has substantial earnings and profits). A, B and C Corp engage in a re-
demption agreement pursuant to which A's stock is to be redeemed for
$100,000 ($1.00 per share as of the date of death; 100,000 shares) upon
A's death. If the redemption is taxed as a sale or exchange of the stock,
the shareholder decedent's estate should recognize no gain due to the
step up in basis to fair market value on the date of the decedent's death.52
Thus, the main reason for avoiding dividend treatment is to take ad-
vantage of the tax-free return of basis. Prior to the imposition of a lower
tax rate upon dividends, historically, the disparity between the ordinary
tax rate imposed on dividend income and capital gains provided an even
greater benefit to sale or exchange treatment upon redemption.
5 3
b. Tax Considerations: Dividend Treatment
If a distribution in redemption of stock by a corporation does not
meet the requirements of section 302(b), the distribution generally will
be classified as a distribution of a dividend to the extent of the corpora-
tion's earnings and profits. 54 If a distribution exceeds earnings and prof-
its, it will represent a return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's
basis in its stock.55 Finally, to the extent the distribution exceeds the
shareholder's basis in its stock, the distribution will be treated as gain
from the sale or exchange of property.56 Due to the fact that an estate
will generally receive a step up in the basis of the decedent's assets to
fair market value on the date of the decedent's death, characterization of
the distribution as a dividend can be very costly from a tax perspective as
compared to sale or exchange treatment which results in little or no tax-
49. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4).
50. See Davis, 397 U.S. at 305.
51. For a thorough analysis of the application of these rules, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EuSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 9 (2005) (cover-
ing redemptions of corporate stock).
52. See I.R.C. § 302(a).
53. If the redemption is taxed as a "dividend" pursuant to § 301(a) and § 302(d), the estate
will be taxed at net capital gain rates pursuant to §I(h)(I 1). See I.R.C. § l(h)(l 1) (generally provid-
ing that qualified dividend income is subject to tax at the net capital gain rates).
54. I.R.C. §§ 301, 302(c)(1).
55. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2).
56. I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(A).
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able gain. This is because, where there are substantial earnings and prof-
its, the full amount of the distribution in redemption will be treated as a
dividend subject to tax. Whereas, in a redemption treated as a sale or
exchange, gain subject to tax on the distribution will be reduced by the
amount of basis that is recovered.
57
2. Tax Impact on Partnerships, LLCs, Partners, and Members
Generally, the payment by a partnership to a partner in complete
liquidation of a partner's interest does not result in a tax consequence to
the partnership.58 Further, assets may generally be distributed in kind
tax-free. 59 However, liquidation payments to partners are governed by
section 736.
Like the rules that apply to corporate shareholder distributions, the
tax consequences to a partner (or member of an LLC which is treated as
a partnership for tax purposes) can be quite complex from a tax perspec-
tive. Initially, section 736 divides liquidation payments into two catego-
ries meeting the definitions of section 736(a) and section 736(b). Pay-
ments classified as section 736(a) payments are further subdivided into
two categories which include payments of a distributive share of partner-
ship income and payments more in the nature of guaranteed payments.
60
The section 736(b) category generally includes payments to the partner
for his or her share of the partnership property.6' Payments to a partner
in relation to partnership property are further subject to either ordinary or
capital characterization depending upon the nature of the property.
For example, payments for substantially appreciated property and
unrealized receivables generally will attract ordinary income treatment.
62
Cash payments for other types of property such as goodwill, for example,
will attract capital gain treatment. 63 Further, tax treatment may differ
depending upon whether the partner was a partner in a partnership in
which capital was an income-producing factor versus a partnership in
which capital was not an income-producing factor.64
II. FEDERAL TAx CONSIDERATIONS OF USING INSURANCE TO FUND
BUY-SELL ARRANGEMENTS
In addition to general business and tax considerations, there are spe-
cific income and estate tax rules that may affect the decision to use in-
surance proceeds to fund either a cross-purchase agreement or redemp-
57. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
58. I.R.C. § 736.
59. 33A AM. JuR. 2d Federal Taxation 10376 (2006).
60. See I.R.C. § 736(a).
61. See I.R.C. § 736(b).
62. See I.R.C. § 751.
63. See I.R.C. §§ 731, 741.
64. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, ch. 22.
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tion agreement. The Code accords special income tax treatment to insur-
ance proceeds that are payable upon the death of the insured.65 Addi-
tionally, the estate tax sections of the Code also provide specific rules
that define when a decedent's gross estate must include insurance pro-
ceeds.
A. Income Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds
Code section 101(a) generally provides that gross income does not
include amounts received under a life insurance contract if such amounts
are paid by reason of death of the insured. 66 Under this rule, a benefici-
ary of a life insurance policy that receives insurance proceeds upon the
death of the insured may exclude the insurance proceeds from gross in-
come.
For example, assume A and B are the only shareholders of C Corp.
Inc. They have engaged in a cross-purchase agreement (the "Agree-
ment") under which, upon the death of either A or B, the other will buy
the decedent's share for $100,000. Pursuant to the Agreement, A and B
each purchase a life insurance policy on the life of the other and each of
them intends to use the proceeds to purchase the other's interest upon the
death of the other party. When A dies, B will receive the $100,000 from
the insurer and may exclude the full amount of the proceeds from in-
come.
67
Exceptions to the section 101(a) general exclusionary rule apply
under certain circumstances. If a life insurance contract or any interest
therein is transferred for valuable consideration, the exclusion from gross
income is limited to an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of the
consideration plus any premiums paid by the transferee. 68  The phrase
"transfer for valuable consideration" is defined as any absolute transfer-
for-value of a right to receive all or part of the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy. 69 Thus, the creation, for value, of an enforceable contrac-
tual right to receive all or a part of the proceeds of a policy may consti-
tute a transfer for valuable consideration of the policy or an interest
therein. 70
65. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
66. id. The tax-free receipt of proceeds can be likened to a free step up in basis. In effect,
I.R.C. §101(a)(l) operates the same as a step up in basis. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(l). I.R.C. § 1022,
which would replace I.R.C. § 1014 at the time of estate tax repeal under current law, provides for
carryover basis. See I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(C). As such, life insurance could be viewed as even more
tax beneficial than other properties.
67. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(l); see also ZARITSKY, supra note 43, 8.02[l][a].
68. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). Also included with the amount paid and any future premiums are
"other amounts" which phrase includes interest paid or accrued by the transferee on indebtedness
with respect to such contract or any interest therein if such interest is not allowable as a deduction
under § 264(a)(4). Id.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.101 -1(b)(4) (as amended in 1982).
70. See id.
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For example, A pays a premium of $500 for an insurance policy in
the face amount of $1,000 upon the life of B, and A subsequently trans-
fers the policy to C for $600. Thereafter, C does not make any additional
payments in relation to the policy and receives the proceeds upon the
death of B. The amount which C can exclude from his income is limited
to $600. The $400 of the proceeds which exceed the $600 purchase price
must be included by C as income.
B. Estate and Transfer Taxation of Life Insurance
In addition to income tax consequences, the impact of using life in-
surance proceeds to fund a buy-sell agreement requires analysis of the
estate tax consequences. Section 2031 operates in conjunction with sec-
tion 2033 and generally defines "gross estate" as including the value of
all of a decedent's property (tangible or intangible and wherever situated)
at the time of death. 71 Broadly, section 2033 requires the value of all of
a decedent's property be included in his or her gross estate at the time of
death. 72 Although sections 2031 and 2033 each relate to value and inclu-
sion, section 2033 identifies includible interests whereas section 2031
generally addresses valuation.73
Identification of specific interests includible in a decedent's gross
estate is addressed in sections 2033 through 2046. 74 Included within that
range of sections is section 2042 which provides rules in regard to inclu-
sion of the value of insurance proceeds in a decedent's gross estate.75
1. Section 2042: Incidents of Ownership
Section 2042 operates under certain circumstances to require inclu-
sion in a gross estate of the value of insurance proceeds payable upon a
decedent's death.76 Taxpayers generally attempt to structure their estates
in a fashion that escapes application of section 2042 thereby excluding
life insurance proceeds from their gross estates. Fundamentally, section
2042 is a specific inclusion section that requires insurance proceeds re-
ceivable by an executor on the life of a decedent to be included in his or
her gross estate.77 There is no question that insurance proceeds from a
policy on the life of the decedent that are actually received by an execu-
tor must be included in a decedent's estate.
Less intuitive is section 2042's requirement under certain circum-
stances that amounts payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent's
71. I.R.C. § 203 l(a); see also I.R.C. § 2033 ("The value of gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
72. See I.R.C. § 2033.
73. See RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION 4.01 (2006),
available at 1999 WL 1031606.
74. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 2033-2046.
75. See I.R.C. § 2042.
76. See id.
77. I.R.C. § 2042(1).
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estate under policies on the life of the decedent must also be included in
the decedent's gross estate. Where the decedent possesses "incidents of
ownership" in relation to the insurance policy, proceeds payable to a
third party must be included in the decedent's gross estate.78 The term
"incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the
79policy in a technical legal sense. Incidents of ownership include any
economic interest or benefit from an insurance policy. 
80
The regulations specifically provide that "incidents of ownership"
include the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the
policy, to assign the policy or revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy
for a loan, or to borrow against the cash surrender value of the policy.
8'
This list, though illustrative, is not exhaustive.82 Incidents of ownership
broadly encompass most every right that is retained in a policy. 83 In the
obvious example, if an insured transfers a policy to another but retains
the right to change the beneficiary on the policy, retention of such right
will result in the proceeds being included in the insured's estate.84
A number of cases and rulings address less obvious examples and
add to the definition of the phrase "incidents of ownership" for purposes
of applying the Code and regulations. In Revenue Ruling 61-123,85 the
IRS ruled on a fact pattern in which an airline passenger purchased an
accident insurance policy on his life prior to his death in an airplane
crash.86 After filling in the beneficiary designation, he mailed the policy
insuring his life to the beneficiary and boarded the plane.87 The proceeds
were not payable to the decedent's estate. However, under these circum-
stances, the IRS ruled that the proceeds of the policy were includible in
the decedent's gross estate even though as a practical matter it was im-
possible for him to exercise any incidents of ownership while the plane
was in flight. 88
Similarly, in Commissioner v. Estate of Noel,89 the decedent's
spouse purchased an accidental death insurance policy on his life several
hours prior to a plane crash, which killed the insured husband.90 Not-
78. I.R.C. § 2042(2).
79. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1979).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 335
(1929); see also ZARITSKY, supra note 43, 8.02[4].
81. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c); see also ZARITSKY, supra note 43, 8.02[4].
82. H.R. REP. No. 2333-77, § 404 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 491; see also
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73, 4.14[4][a].
83. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73, 4.14[4][a], available at 1999 WL 1031619.
84. See I.R.C. § 2042(2). This analysis is similar to the analysis applied in sections 2036
through 2038 relating to transfers of property where an interest is retained by the grantor of the
property. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038.




89. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
90. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. at 679-80.
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withstanding that the decedent was in transit and could not actually have
exercised any incidents of ownership, the Supreme Court held that the
proceeds must be included in the decedent's estate. 91 The holding in
Noel and the outcome in Rev. Rul. 61-123 indicate a tendency on the part
of the Court and the IRS to find and apply incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy where an individual has the right to change the benefi-
ciary even though the individual had no real control over the beneficiary
designation.
The right to change a beneficiary designation is not the only attrib-
ute that may result in incidents of ownership. Use of an insurance policy
as collateral will also constitute "incidents of ownership." In Estate of
Krischer v. Commissioner,92 the decedent obtained loans, renewals of
loans, or additions to existing loans from a financial institution.93 At
inception, each loan was secured by either one or both of two life insur-
ance policies.94 Renewals or additions to such loans were expressly
made subject to an assignment of those policies as collateral. 95 The
Commissioner determined that the decedent possessed incidents of own-
ership in the policies by virtue of his power to pledge them as collateral
for past and future loans.96 Attribution of incidents of ownership to the
decedent caused the proceeds to be includible in decedent's gross estate
pursuant to section 2042(2). 97 The Court in Estate of Krischer agreed.98
Thus, notwithstanding that the policy owner irrevocably transfers a pol-
icy, if the owner retains the right to use the policy as collateral, the owner
will continue to have incidents of ownership under section 2042(2).
In each of the above cases or rulings, the proceeds of the life insur-
ance policy were payable to a third party and not the decedent insured's
estate. Under these circumstances, section 2042 nevertheless operated to
include the proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. The courts and the
IRS have been very liberal in attributing incidents of ownership to a de-
cedent where the decedent has retained even the slightest rights to exer-
cise control over the policy.
However, the power to substitute one life insurance policy for an-
other of equal value appears not to be an incident of ownership. In Es-
tate of Jordahl v. Commissioner,99 the decedent created a trust and
named himself as one of three trustees. 100 The corpus of the trust in-
cluded insurance policies on the decedent's life and other income-
91. Id. at 683-84.
92. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 821, 1973 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117 (1973).
93. Id. at *3.
94. Krischer, 1973 Tax Ct. Memo Lexis 117, at *3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *13.
99. 65 T.C. 92 (1975).
100. Jordahl, 65 T.C. at 92.
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producing assets. 10' The trustees were instructed to pay the premiums
out of the assets of the trust and to pay over any remaining income to the
decedent. 102 At no time was income insufficient to pay the premiums. 1
03
On his death, his daughter was to receive the income until she reached
age 50 at which time she was to receive the principal. 104 The decedent
retained the power to substitute securities, property, and policies "of
equal value" for those transferred to the trust. 105 The court held that the
insurance proceeds were not includible because the right to substitute
other policies "of equal value" did not give him a right to the "economic
benefits" of the policies and because his powers as trustee were strictly
limited. 1
06
a. Incidents of Ownership Held by Corporations
i. Current Treasury Regulations
Incidents of ownership on a policy held by a corporation can also be
attributed to an individual shareholder of the corporation. Insurance pro-
ceeds payable to a third party other than the corporation must be included
in an insured shareholder's estate if the insured shareholder can actually
exercise any incident of ownership in the policy. 10 7 Thus, an insured
shareholder will be attributed incidents of ownership held by the corpora-
tion where the insured owns a controlling interest in the corporation and
the proceeds are payable to a beneficiary other than the corporation.1
08
However, a shareholder may avoid being attributed incidents of owner-
ship in an insurance policy possessed by the corporation under certain
circumstances. Regulations under section 2042 provide an exception to
this general rule of inclusion where a corporation's incidents of owner-
ship will not be attributed to a decedent through stock ownership to the
extent that the proceeds are payable directly to the corporation. 109
The above analysis under the regulations first hinges on whether the
corporation or a third party receives the insurance proceeds. More spe-
cifically, where a corporation is the beneficiary and recipient of proceeds






106. Id. at 101 (citing I.R.C. § 2042(2)).
107. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1979). An example is given in the regula-
tions providing that if the decedent is the controlling stockholder in a corporation and the corpora-
tion owns a life insurance policy on his or her life, the proceeds of which are payable to the dece-
dent's spouse, the incidents of ownership held by the corporation will be attributed to the decedent
through his or her stock ownership and the proceeds will be included in his or her estate under sec-
tion 2042. Id.
108. Id.; see also KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING & WEALTH PRESERVATION:
STRATEGIES & SOLUTIONS 12.02[][b][i] (2005).
109. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
ration's incidents of ownership will never be attributed to the decedent
shareholder through his or her stock. "0 This rule operates notwithstand-
ing the fact that a majority shareholder would have actual control over
any insurance policy held by the corporation. Applying this rule in isola-
tion appears to allow the insurance proceeds to escape inclusion in a ma-
jority shareholder's estate and escape the direct requirements of section
2042 of the Code. However, as discussed extensively below, estates of
majority shareholders have historically reported the value of the proceeds
indirectly via an increase in the value of the decedent shareholder's stock
under the general inclusion rule of section 2031.
On the other hand, where the insurance proceeds are not payable to
or for the benefit of the corporation, the question arises as to whether
incidents of ownership held by the corporation will be attributed to an
insured shareholder. Where a decedent shareholder owns a controlling
interest and the proceeds are payable to a third party (e.g., not the corpo-
ration), incidents of ownership held by the corporation are attributed to
the decedent shareholder's estate under section 2042.111 The attribution
of incidents under these circumstances is based upon the fact that a ma-
jority shareholder has authority to actually exercise control over the pol-
icy. This, in turn, causes the insurance proceeds to be included in the
majority shareholder's estate notwithstanding that the proceeds are pay-
able to a third party. However, if a decedent shareholder owns only a
minority interest, no incidents are attributable and no proceeds are di-
rectly included in the decedent shareholder's estate. 112
Operation of these rules is demonstrated in the following example
provided in the regulations under section 2042. Assume the decedent
was the controlling stockholder in a corporation. Further, assume that
the corporation owned a life insurance policy on the decedent share-
holder's life and the proceeds were payable to the decedent's spouse, a
third party. The incidents of ownership held by the corporation are at-
tributed to the decedent through his stock ownership and all of the pro-
ceeds are includible in the decedent's gross estate under section 2042.113
However, if in this example the policy proceeds had been payable forty
percent (40%) to the decedent's spouse and sixty percent (60%) to the
corporation, only forty percent of the proceeds would be included in de-
cedent's estate under section 2042.114 While the example in the Regula-
tion does not specifically address the remaining sixty percent of the in-
surance proceeds that went to the corporation, it can be inferred that the
value of the corporate stock in the decedent's estate will increase due to
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also be inferred that the increased value of the decedent's stock must be
included in the decedent's gross estate under section 2031. 115
In sum, the regulations appear to require inclusion of at least a rat-
able portion of the value of the insurance proceeds in a shareholder's
estate where the proceeds are payable to the corporation under section
2031. Where the corporation receives the insurance proceeds, the Regu-
lations operate on the presumption that the value of the corporate stock
included in a decedent's estate under section 2031 will increase propor-
tionately upon the corporation's receipt of the insurance proceeds. Con-
versely, where policy proceeds are payable to a party other than the cor-
poration (or the insured shareholder's estate) and corporate incidents are
attributable to the decedent shareholder, the decedent shareholder's es-
tate is required to include all of the proceeds in his or her gross estate
under section 2042. These rules reflect the close relationship that exists
between section 2042 and section 2031.
ii. Current Case Law
The above analysis under the regulations is not, however, consistent
with recent holdings of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of
Cartwright v. Commissioner'1 6 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner.117 In Cartwright, the dece-
dent, Mr. Cartwright, was a majority shareholder in the CSB law firm
("CSB"), a California professional corporation."18 Mr. Cartwright died
in 1988 owning a majority 71.43% of the shares of CSB. 1 9 CSB held
two insurance policies on the life of Mr. Cartwright which, upon his
death, paid a total of $5,062,029 in proceeds.120 Pursuant to a redemp-
tion agreement in place at the time of Mr. Cartwright's death between
CSB and its shareholders, CSB paid the insurance proceeds that it re-
ceived to Mr. Cartwright's estate in redemption of Mr. Cartwright's
shares. '21 CSB treated $4,080,256 of the total payment as non-employee
compensation and the remaining approximately one million dollars as a
payment in redemption of Mr. Cartwright's stock. 122 However, the es-
tate treated the full amount received as paid in redemption of Mr. Cart-
115. See T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974 IRB LEXIS 835, at *3 (1974) (providing that
where a corporation is the beneficiary of any portion of the proceeds of a life insurance policy, there
is no need for that portion to be included in the gross estate under section 2042 because it directly
affects the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's gross estate). See infra Part
ll.B. 1.a.iii.
116. 183 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1998).
117. 428 F.3d 1338 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
118. Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1035; see also Estate of Cartwright v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
3200, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 299, at *3 (1996) (indicating that they incorporated the firm of
Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin & Sucherman, Inc. (CSB), as a professional corporation under Califor-
nia law).
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wright's stock and none of the payment as non-employee compensa-
tion.12 ' The IRS disagreed with the estate and determined that the
$4,080,256 was compensation and that the estate owed $1,142,472 for its
tax deficiency. 24  Consistent with CSB's treatment, the IRS treated the
additional approximately one million dollars as the redemption amount.
The first issue the court addressed was whether the payment to Mr.
Cartwright's estate was made solely for redemption of the stock or
whether it was in part for Mr. Cartwright's stock and in part for his claim
for compensation due. 125 Mr. Cartwright's estate contended that the full
$5 million should be treated as paid in exchange for the redemption of
the decedent's stock. 126 In affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that approximately one million dollars of the insurance pro-
ceeds constituted payment for Cartwright's stock and approximately four
million dollars constituted compensation for services. 127  Under the
Ninth Circuit's holding, approximately four-fifths of the payment consti-
tuted a liability of the company that related to compensation for services
rendered before the decedent shareholder's death.
The court next addressed whether the five million dollars of insur-
ance proceeds should have been included as an asset of CSB for purposes
of valuing CSB stock held by Mr. Cartwright's estate under section
2031.128 Affirming the Tax Court again and quoting the regulations un-
der section 2031, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the Tax Court appropri-
ately excluded all of the life insurance proceeds in valuing stock. 129 The
court indicated that consideration must be given to non-operating assets
including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit





127. Id. at 1036-38.
128. Id. at 1037-38.
129. Id. at 1038. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0(2) provides that the fair market value of shares of
stock should be determined by considering the company's net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend-paying capacity, and other relative factors. The regulation states that:
Some of the "other relevant factors".., are: The goodwill of the business; the economic
outlook in the particular industry; the company's position in the industry and its man-
agement; the degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be
valued; and the values of securities of corporations engaged in the same or similar lines
of business which are listed on a stock exchange. However, the weight to be accorded
such comparisons or any other evidentiary factors considered in the determination of a
value depends upon the facts of each case. In addition to the relevant factors described
above, consideration shall also be given to non-operating assets, including proceeds of
life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent such
non-operating assets have not been taken into account in the determination of net worth,
prospective earning power and dividend-earning capacity. Complete financial and other
data upon which the valuation is based should be submitted with the return, including
copies of reports of any examinations of the company made by accountants, engineers, or
any technical experts as of or near the applicable valuation date.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0(2) (emphasis added).
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taken into account in determining net worth. 130 The court reasoned that
the proceeds received by CSB from the insurance policy would not nec-
essarily affect what a willing buyer would pay for CSB's stock because
the insurance proceeds were offset dollar-for-dollar by CSB's obligation
to pay out the entirety of policy benefits to Cartwright's estate.' 31 Thus,
the Court classified the insurance proceeds as being the kind of ordinary
non-operating asset that should not be included in the value of CSB un-
der the Treasury Regulations. Neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals made any distinction between the approximately
four million dollar payment related to compensation and the approxi-
mately one million dollars remitted to the estate in redemption of the
decedent's shares. By excluding all of the insurance proceeds from the
value of CSB, no distinction was made between the four million dollar
obligation for services provided by the decedent prior to death and the
one million dollar obligation to redeem the decedent's shares. Further,
by failing to make any distinction between the two obligations, the hold-
ing in Cartwright allowed the estate to value its shares of CSB without
proportionately increasing the value of the decedent's shares by a ratable
portion of the one million dollars of insurance proceeds paid to the estate
in the redemption.
On October 31, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue
in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner.132 In Estate of Blount, the dece-
dent, Mr. Blount, was one of two shareholders of Blount Construction
Company ("BCC"), a corporation formed in the state of Georgia.' 33 The
two shareholders, Mr. Blount and Mr. Jennings entered into a stock re-
demption agreement that required BCC to purchase the stock on the
death of the holder at a price agreed upon by the parties. 134 In the early
1990s, BCC purchased insurance policies providing roughly three mil-
lion dollars in order to fulfill its commitments to purchase the sharehold-
ers' stock under the redemption agreement. 1
35
In 1996, Mr. Blount was diagnosed with cancer, and his doctor pre-
dicted that he had only a few months to live. 36 When Blount died in
1997, he owned roughly 83% of BCC, a clear majority interest. 137 In
accordance with the redemption agreement, BCC paid Mr. Blount's es-
tate four million dollars. 38 Mr. Blount's estate reported the value of the
shares at four million dollars. 39 However, the IRS determined that the
130. Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1038 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f)(2)).
131. Id. at 1038.
132. 428 F.3d at 1339.




137. Id. at 1341.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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value of the stock was $7,921,975 and that the taxpayer had undervalued
the stock by approximately four million dollars. 1
40
Based upon expert testimony, the Tax Court concluded that the
value of the company was approximately $6.75 million. 14' The Tax
Court then added the insurance proceeds of $3.1 million to the value of
the company to arrive at $9.85 million as the fair market value of the
stock. 142 On review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the $6.75 mil-
lion valuation for BCC was not erroneous. 143 However, the court of Ap-
peals found that the inclusion by the Tax Court of the additional $3.1
million in insurance proceeds was in error. 44
In declining to include the insurance proceeds in the value of BCC,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Cartwright finding it to
be "persuasive and consistent with common business sense." 145 Like the
Cartwright court, the Blount court quoted regulations under section 2031
stating that in valuing the corporate stock, "consideration shall also be
given to non-operating assets, including insurance proceeds of life insur-
ance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent
that such non-operating assets have not been taken into account in the
determination of net worth."' 146 Focusing on the last clause of the quoted
section of the regulation, the court concluded that the language limiting
inclusion to the extent that such assets have not been taken into account
in determining net worth precludes inclusion of the value of the insur-
ance proceeds received by BCC.147 The court reasoned that insurance
proceeds are not the kind of ordinary non-operating asset that should be
included in the value of the corporation. 148 Further, to the extent the
insurance proceeds are required to be used to redeem the decedent share-
holder's interest in the corporation, the proceeds are offset dollar-for-
dollar by the corporation's obligation to purchase decedent's stock under
the redemption agreement. 
149
In a footnote, the court indicated that the Commissioner argued that
this interpretation frustrates the clear intent of Congress to include corpo-
rate owned life insurance in the estate of its sole shareholder. 150 How-
ever, in the same footnote, the court stated that "the legislative history
relied upon by the Commissioner indicate[s] only that Congress believed
140. Id.




145. Id. at 1345.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Estate of Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1038; Huntsman v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 875
(1976)).
148. Id. at 1346.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1345 n.6.
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that a sole shareholder was deemed to have the incidents of ownership
possessed by his corporation on insurance policies on his life."'' The
footnote goes on to briefly interpret Congressional intent:
[T]he [R]egulations now provide that the incidents of ownership held
by a corporation are not to be attributed to its shareholder, and no in-
dication is included in the committee reports that Congress intended
property owned by a decedent to be includable in his gross estate at
other than its fair market value. 1
52
The court further supported this questionable conclusion by indicating
that "[t]o suggest that a reasonably competent business person, interested
in acquiring a company, would ignore a $3 million liability strains credu-
lity and defies any sensible construct of fair market value."1
53
iii. Applying the Case Doctrine Produces a Different
Outcome than Application of the Code and Regula-
tions
(a) Under the Cases
The opinions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in Cartwright and
Blount each addressed valuation of corporate stock within a decedent
shareholder's estate in connection with a corporate redemption agree-
ment. In both cases, the corporation in question owned a life insurance
policy insuring the life of the majority shareholder, and the corporation
received the insurance proceeds upon the majority shareholder's death.
Both opinions focused upon determining stock value for purposes of
including such value in the decedent shareholder's gross estate for pur-
poses of section 2031. Each opinion concluded that the insurance pro-
ceeds received by the company should not affect the value of the stock in
the decedent's estate. Each court reasoned that the insurance proceeds
were to be offset dollar-for-dollar against an existing obligation of each
corporation.
However, there is at least one factual distinction between the two
cases. In Blount, all of the amounts received by the decedent share-
holder's estate were in return for the stock redeemed by the corpora-
tion. 15 4  In Cartwright, however, only approximately one-fifth of the
amounts received by the decedent shareholder's estate were received in
return for the decedent shareholder's stock. 155 The remaining four-fifths
of the amounts received were for services provided by the decedent
shareholder prior to his death. The large majority of the amounts re-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1346.
154. See id. at 1339-41.
155. Estate of Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1036, 1038.
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ceived by the decedent shareholder's estate represented an accrued com-
pensation liability of the corporation not associated in any way with the
obligation of the corporation to redeem the decedent shareholder's stock.
Due to the perceived dollar-for-dollar offset of these liabilities, each
of the opinions results in the exclusion of insurance proceeds in valuing
the corporate stock. Without an increase in the value of the stock related
to the corporation's receipt of insurance proceeds, the estates of the two
decedent majority shareholders effectively were allowed to exclude the
value of any portion of the insurance proceeds in their respective estates.
This outcome stands regardless of the fact that in each case, the majority
shareholder actually had control over his respective corporation and,
therefore, control over all of the incidents of ownership of the policies
held by the corporations.
(b) Under the Regulations
Application of current regulations under sections 2042 and 2031 to
the facts in each of these cases results in a different outcome than arrived
at by the Blount and Cartwright courts. Because CSB and BCC received
the proceeds of the life insurance policies on Cartwright and Blount re-
spectively, the regulations specifically indicate that neither shareholder is
attributed corporate incidents of ownership.156 Therefore, neither of the
decedent shareholders' estates would be attributed incidents of owner-
ship, nor would either estate be required to include the insurance pro-
ceeds in gross estate under section 2042.
However, in determining the value of the stock under section 2031,
Regulations section 20.2031-2(f) requires that consideration be given to
non-operating assets, including proceeds of life insurance policies pay-
able to or for the benefit of the company. 157 Contrary to the interpreta-
tions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal in Cartwright and Blount, the intent
of this rule is to reflect the insurance proceeds received by the corpora-
tion as an asset that proportionately increases the value of the deceased
shareholder's stock. The decedent shareholder's stock value for pur-
poses of calculating gross estate must increase proportionate to the value
of the insurance proceeds received by the company.
This conclusion is supported by the language in section 2042 and
Regulations section 20.2042-1(c)(6). As previously discussed, section
2042 requires a decedent's estate to include all "amount[s] receivable by
all other beneficiaries," under a policy on the life an insured shareholder
with respect to which the shareholder possessed incidents of owner-
ship. 158 Given that the definition of incidents of ownership is broad and
includes "any" incidents of ownership, Congress must have intended that
156. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
157. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0
158. I.R.C. § 2042(2).
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incidents of ownership be attributed to a majority shareholder of a corpo-
ration that owns a life insurance policy in the shareholder's life. ' 59 It is
unlikely that Congress intended that a decedent majority shareholder be
allowed to escape inclusion in his or her estate of life insurance proceeds
received by his or her controlled corporation.
While the regulations under section 2042 clearly provide an excep-
tion to the inclusion of the proceeds where the corporation receives the
proceeds, the regulations nevertheless attempt to further Congress' clear
intent by requiring inclusion of a ratable portion of the proceeds in a de-
cedent shareholder's gross estate as follows:
In the case of economic benefits of a life insurance policy on the de-
cedent's life that are reserved to a corporation of which the decedent
is the sole or controlling stockholder, the corporation's incidents of
ownership will not be attributed to the decedent through his stock
ownership to the extent the proceeds of the policy are payable to the
corporation .... See § 20.2031-209 for a rule providing that the in-
surance proceeds of certain life insurance policies shall be consid-
ered in determining the value of decedent's stock. '60
The first sentence is the exception to the general rule of inclusion
that prevents corporate incidents from being attributed to a sole or major-
ity shareholder where the policy proceeds are payable to the corporation.
If the goal of section 2042 is to include the proceeds in a decedent's es-
tate where a decedent has incidents of ownership, why are the incidents
of ownership in the case of a majority shareholder specifically not attrib-
uted under the above regulation? The answer lies in the third sentence in
the above quoted portion of the regulation. The third sentence, high-
lighted in italics and bold, refers to regulations under subsection
20.2031-2(f), which is specifically discussed by both the Cartwright and
Blount courts. This regulation provides factors and guidelines for valu-
ing stock that is not publicly traded, like the stock of CSB and BCC.
161
Under this regulation, consideration must be given to non-operating as-
sets, including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the
benefit of the company, to the extent such non-operating assets have not
been taken into account in the determination of net worth. 162 Read in
conjunction with the first sentence of the above quoted language, section
20.2042-1 (c)(6) is attempting to require inclusion of a ratable portion of
the proceeds in the decedent majority shareholder's estate via a perceived
increase in the value of the stock upon the corporation's receipt of the
proceeds.
159. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c)(2).
160. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (emphasis added).
161. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f).
162. Id.
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The Treasury's statements in 1974 in the preamble to the amend-
ments to regulations under sections 2031 and 2042 support this reading
of the regulation.' 63 In 1974, Treasury Decision 7312 was published
amending the regulations under section 2042 to add, among other things,
the current version of Regulation section 20.2042-1(c)(6) and to specifi-
cally amend paragraph (f) of Regulation section 20.2031-2.' 64 The pre-
amble to the 1974 amendments provides the following explanation:
Under section 2042 of the Code, if a decedent died possessed of any
incidents of ownership in a life insurance policy on his life, the entire
proceeds of the policy will be included in his gross estate for estate
tax purposes. The term "incidents of ownership" is described in §
20.2042-1(c)(2) as including "a power to change the beneficiary re-
served to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder."1
65
A problem was presented in Revenue Ruling 71-463, 1971-2 C.B.
333, which ruling was later withdrawn by Revenue Ruling 72-167,
1972-1 C.B. 307, as to whether a controlling stockholder should be
treated as a "sole stockholder" for purposes of section 2042. The po-
sition taken in the proposed rules is that a controlling stockholder
should be so treated. However, where a corporation is the benefici-
ary of any portion of the proceeds of a life insurance policy, there is
no need for that portion to be included in the gross estate under
2042 because it directly affects the value of the stock that is in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate.
Accordingly, §20.2042-1(c) is amended by this document to provide
that, with respect to proceeds of corporate-owned life insurance
which are payable to either the corporation or a third party for a valid
business purpose, incidents of ownership held by the corporation will
not be attributed to the decedent through his stock ownership. 166
Thus, where the corporation is the beneficiary of any portion of the
policy proceeds, there is no need for that portion to be included in the
gross estate under section 2042 or the regulations thereunder because it
directly affects the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's
gross estate under the section 2031 Regulations. 167 The intent of the
1974 change in the regulations was to remove the insurance proceeds
from section 2042's inclusion requirement because the proceeds directly
increase the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2031.168 Without the exclusionary provision in the
section 2042 regulations, the insurance proceeds would conceivably be
included in a decedent shareholder's estate twice. The insurance pro-
163. See T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974 LRB LEXIS 835, *1-4 (1974).
164. Id. at *5-10.
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at * 1-2.
168. Id.
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ceeds would be included once via section 2042 due to the fact that the
shareholder actually has incidents of ownership in the policies held by
the corporation. The insurance proceeds would be included a second
time under section 2031 due to the increase in the value of the shares
held by the decedent shareholder's estate when the insurance proceeds
are paid to the corporation. In an effort to prevent double inclusion in
the decedent shareholder's estate of the value of the proceeds received by
the corporation, the insurance proceeds included under section 2042 are
removed by an amendment to the regulations leaving a single propor-
tionate inclusion under section 2031 when valuing the stock held by the
decedent shareholder at the time of his or her death. 1
69
Without discussing the intent of section 2042 and the regulations
thereunder, the opinions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits seem incom-
plete. A more complete analysis may have first acknowledged that each
court, in effect, included the insurance proceeds in valuing the stock of
each corporation but then removed the value of the insurance proceeds
by offsetting the proceeds dollar-for-dollar against the perceived obliga-
tions to the decedent shareholder's estates. In short, by removing the
value of the insurance proceeds from the value of the stock, the insurance
proceeds have been completely excluded from the decedent majority
shareholder's estate, notwithstanding that the decedent had incidents of
ownership over the policy. Without a discussion of the regulatory exclu-
sion of insurance proceeds and the history behind the exception, the ex-
planation as to why the value of the insurance proceeds was offset dollar-
for-dollar by each corporation's obligation to the decedent's share-
holder's estate is at best incomplete and in both instances possibly inac-
curate.
(c) The Analysis of the Blount and Cartwright
Courts is Incorrect from an Accounting and Fi-
nancial Perspective
In addition to incorrectly applying the Code and regulations to the
circumstances in Blount and Cartwright, the conclusion reached by each
of the courts that the obligation of BCC and CSB to redeem the share-
holder should be offset dollar-for-dollar against the insurance proceeds is
incorrect from an accounting and financial perspective. While a third
party might value a target corporation by treating a redemption obliga-
tion as a liability, it is not at all appropriate for a shareholder to reduce
the value of the company by the value of his or her shares.
The Blount court summarized its position when it stated that "[t]o
suggest that a reasonably competent business person, interested in ac-
quiring a company, would ignore a $3 million liability strains credulity
169. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-1(c)(6), 20.2031-2(f); see also T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974
IRB LEXIS 835, *2-3 (1974).
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and defies any sensible construct of fair market value."'' 70 While it may
be logical from an unrelated third-party purchaser's perspective to in-
clude the liability associated with a redemption agreement in its purchase
price analysis, neither the Cartwright court nor the Blount court com-
pared a redeemed shareholder's perspective to a third-party purchaser's
perspective. However, the Tax Court's opinion in Blount (later reversed
by the Eleventh Circuit) did contain specific and persuasive analysis re-
garding the effect of a redemption obligation on insurance proceeds re-
ceived by a corporation.'17 In the Tax Court, Mr. Blount's estate argued
that the court should treat BCC's enforceable $4 million dollar redemp-
tion obligation as a corporate liability in determining the value of the
decedent shareholder's shares. 72 In making this argument, the estate
recognized the liability would operate to offset the value of the insurance
proceeds received by the corporation. By lowering the value of the com-
pany, the proportionate value of the decedent's stock would also be re-
duced. In declining to allow the offset, the Tax Court reasoned that the
redemption obligation should not be treated as a value depressing corpo-
rate liability when the very shares that are the subject of the redemption
obligation are being valued. 173 The Tax Court's holding would have
resulted in a proportionate increase in the value of Mr. Blount's stock
that would have increased Mr. Blount's gross estate for estate tax pur-
poses.
In addressing the estate's argument, the Tax Court noted the distinc-
tion between a third-party purchase of the shares and the corporation's
redemption of its shares from a shareholder and provided the following:
A simplified example will illustrate the fallacy behind the estate's
contention that BCC's obligation to redeem decedent's shares should
be treated as a liability offsetting a corresponding amount of corpo-
rate assets. Assume corporation X has 100 shares outstanding and
two shareholders, A and B, each holding 50 shares. X's sole asset is $
1 million in cash. X has entered into an agreement obligating it to
purchase B's shares at his death for $ 500,000. If, at B's death, X's $
500,000 redemption obligation is treated as a liability of X for pur-
poses of valuing B's shares, then X's value becomes $ 500,000 ($ 1
million cash less a $ 500,000 redemption obligation). It would follow
that the value of B's shares (and A's shares) is $ 250,000 (i.e., one
half of the corporation's $ 500,000 value) upon B's death. Yet if B's
shares are then redeemed for $ 500,000, A's shares are then worth $
170. Estate of Blount, 428 F.3d at 1346.
171. Estate of Blount v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 2004 Tax. Ct. Memo LEXIS 117,
*78-86 (2004), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 428 F.3d 1338 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
172. Id. at *78.
173. Id. at *80.
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500,000-that is, A's 50 shares constitute 100-percent ownership of
a corporation with $ 500,000 in cash. 1
74
The Tax Court then pointed out that it could not be correct that B's
one half interest in one million dollars in cash was only worth $250,000,
nor could it be correct that A's one half interest in the remainder shifted
from a value of $250,000 pre-redemption to a value of $500,000 post-
redemption. 175  Further, the error in relation to the valuation of B's
shares in the example was the recognition of the corporation's redemp-
tion obligation as a claim on the corporate assets when valuing the same
shares that would be redeemed with those assets. 176 By contrast, a hypo-
thetical third-party buyer of A's shares would pay $500,000 for A's
shares whether the redemption obligation existed or not. 177 This is be-
cause a third-party purchaser would take account of both the liability
arising from the redemption obligation and the shift in the proportionate
interest of A's shares as a result of the redemption. 178
Treating the corporation's obligation to redeem a shareholder (or a
shareholder's estate) as a liability in valuing the company for purpose of
redemption would result in valuing the corporation in its post redemption
configuration. 179 There is an important distinction between valuing stock
to be redeemed from a shareholder and valuing stock prior to a purchase
by a third party. With respect to valuing stock to be redeemed, the
shareholder (or shareholder's estate) will always seek to receive his or
her ratable share of the value of the company previous to the redemp-
tion. 180 Whereas, a third unrelated party would analyze the purchase of
the stock held by the remaining shareholders based upon the value of the
shares that remain after the redemption takes place.
So, why is it that the Tax Court decided in Cartwright that CSB's
obligation to the decedent shareholder should offset the insurance pro-
ceeds received by the corporation while the Tax Court's decision in
Blount denied a similar offset? That too was logically explained by the
174. Id. at *81-82 (footnotes omitted).
175. Id. at *82.
176. Id. at *82-83.
177. Id. at *83 n.36.
178. Id. at *83.
179. Id. at *79-80.
180. See id. at *80-83. In a more extreme example, it would make no sense that a 99% share-
holder would base the value of his or her redemption on post-redemption value of 1%. On the other
hand, a hypothetical third party willing buyer looking to purchase all of the stock of BCC prior to
redeeming the decedent shareholder's estate would correctly consider the corporation's liability in
determining the value of the shares. This is so because the obligation to redeem the decedent share-
holder's estate would continue after the third party purchaser's acquisition of the stock. Such a
hypothetical purchaser's stock value in BCC would decrease proportionately when the redemption
occurred. Using the same example, where a third party seeks to purchase a company that is obliged
to redeem a 99% shareholder. It would make no sense for the third-party acquirer to pay more than
1% of the pre-redemption value of the company. A third-party buyer will seek to value what he or
she will have at the moment after purchase. Whereas, a shareholder that is to be redeemed will seek
to value what he or she has a moment before the purchase.
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Tax Court in its decision in Blount. As previously indicated, four-fifths
of the liability in Cartwright was related to personal services provided by
Mr. Cartwright to CSB before his death. This four-fifths portion of the
liability was not a corporate obligation to redeem its stock.18" ' Rather, it
was a liability for services performed-not meaningfully different from
any other liability of the corporation that would be netted against assets
to ascertain the net value of the company.' 82 Upon finding that approxi-
mately four-fifths of the obligation in Cartwright was not a redemption,
the Tax Court concluded that the whole liability in Cartwright should be
offset dollar-for-dollar against the insurance proceeds. Whereas, the Tax
Court properly found that the obligation in Blount was a redemption, as
opposed to an ordinary liability, which should not be an offsetting liabil-
ity against the insurance proceeds. 1
83
While this analysis explains why four-fifths of the liability in Cart-
wright should be a liability that is offset against the assets of the com-
pany (including any insurance proceeds received), the Tax Court failed
to completely clear the air in relation to the remaining one-fifth of the
liability related solely to redemption of Mr. Cartwright's shares held by
his estate. The remaining one-fifth of the liability in Cartwright is indis-
tinguishable from the whole liability in Blount. Recognizing this, the
Tax Court conceded in its decision in Blount that the remaining one-fifth
portion of the liability in Cartwright constituted an obligation to redeem
stock. 184 Thus, it might have been appropriate for the Tax Court to have
also conceded that the remaining one-fifth of the liability in Cartwright
should not have been an obligation that was recognized in valuing the
corporation.
iv. Summary: Incidents of Ownership Held by Corpora-
tions
Based upon the above analysis, it is clear that the manner in which
the Treasury and the Tax Court value a decedent's ownership equity in-
terest in a corporation are at odds with the manner in which the Cart-
wright and Blount courts have interpreted the Code and relevant Regula-
tions. The Code generally requires a decedent to include in his or her
gross estate the value of policy proceeds payable upon the decedent's
death to the extent that the decedent held incidents of ownership in the
insurance policy. However, the regulations allow a decedent majority
shareholder's estate to exclude the value of insurance proceeds received
by the decedent's wholly or majority owned corporation notwithstanding
181. Id. at *84.
182. Id.
183. See id. at *85-86; see also Huntsman v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 874 (1976) (indicating that
insurance proceeds are treated like any other nonoperating asset when determining a closely held
corporation's value); Estate of Blount, 2004 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117, at *77.
184. Estate of Blount, 2004 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117, at *84-85.
[Vol. 84:2
2006] ESTATE TAXATION OFREDEMPTIONAGREEMENTS 521
that the decedent could have exercised actual control over the insurance
policy. The exclusionary exception provided by the regulations was de-
signed to prevent double inclusion of the value of the insurance policies
in the decedent's estate, By allowing an exclusion where the corporation
receives the policy proceeds, the regulations contemplate inclusion of a
single ratable share of the insurance proceeds via an increase in the dece-
dent's stock interest. Thus, in order to include the value of the dece-
dent's interest in the corporation, the value of the insurance proceeds
must at least be included in the value of the company one time.
However, the Ninth Circuit's and the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in
Cartwright and Blount thwart the above analysis. The Cartwright and
Blount decisions require a dollar-for-dollar offset of the insurance pro-
ceeds received by a corporation against the corporation's obligation to
redeem the decedent shareholder. This dollar-for-dollar offset reduces
the overall value of the corporation when valuing the deceased share-
holders shares. The effect of these holdings is to allow decedent sole or
majority shareholders to avoid including a ratable share of the value of
the insurance proceeds received by the corporation notwithstanding that
such a shareholder may exercise actual control over the insurance policy
held by the corporation. This outcome is contrary to the Code's overall
requirement that such proceeds must be included in gross estate where
the decedent has incidents of ownership in the policy. The outcome is
also contrary to the goal of the regulations to include at least a ratable
share of the proceeds in a deceased shareholder's estate.
b. Incidents of Ownership Held by Partnerships and LLCs
The above described inconsistency between the Blount and Cart-
wright opinions and the regulations under sections 2031 and 2042 also
affects the valuation of a deceased partner or member's equity interest in
a partnership or LLC where a redemption agreement is in place. In gen-
eral, partnerships may be treated both as an "entity" for federal income
tax purposes and, under other circumstances, partnerships may be con-
sidered as an "aggregate" of individuals each treated as directly owning
an interest in the partnership assets and operations. 185
If a partnership or LLC is considered as an entity separate from its
partners or members under the entity theory of partnership taxation, the
partnership itself, instead of the partners individually, would have all the
incidents of ownership. 86 For purposes of the following discussion, it
will be assumed that an LLC is treated as a "partnership" for federal in-
come tax purposes and that the members of an LLC are "partners" for
purposes of analysis. In relation to valuation for purposes of estate taxa-
tion of a deceased partner's interest in a partnership, the entity theory of
185. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, 1.02[1].
186. Id; see also I.R.C. § 701; MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31,1 1 .02[2].
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partnership taxation would appear to be analogous to the manner in
which the shareholders of a corporation would be taxed, as previously
discussed. Except in certain rare circumstances, subchapter K of the
Code generally imposes tax on the individual partners rather than the
partnership. 1
87
A different outcome might be obtained under the aggregate theory
of ownership. If a general partnership owns an insurance policy, inci-
dents of ownership appear to be attributed to an aggregate of the general
partners and, therefore, to each one individually. 188 This rule would at-
tribute to each general partner without regard to the percentage of owner-
ship in the partnership, incidents of ownership in policies of insurance
held by the partnership on a partner's life. Under the aggregate theory,
several minority general partners might each be treated as having inci-
dents of ownership in an insurance policy. Thus, where a minority cor-
porate shareholder is clearly not attributed incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy held by the corporation, it is unclear whether a minority
general partner should be attributed incidents of ownership. Further
questions arise in relation to treatment of limited partners and members
of an LLC.
i. Where Proceeds are Payable to Partnership or LLC
Under the aggregate and entity theories of partnership taxation, the
question arises as to whether partners of a partnership or members of an
LLC should be attributed incidents of ownership in a policy owned by
the entity. Cases and administrative rulings have addressed this issue
without complete agreement on the treatment of incidents of ownership
in the partnership setting. Arguably, at least one similarity exists in the
treatment of incidents of ownership in the corporate and partnership set-
tings. If the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of a deceased
partner are payable to or for the benefit of the partnership, then such pro-
ceeds should not be included in the gross estate under section 2042.189
Of course, this similarity immediately calls into question whether the
Blount and Cartwright opinions impact valuation of a decedent partner's
equity interest where a redemption agreement is in place between the
decedent and the partnership. Beyond this similarity, several inconsis-
tencies arise in the treatment of corporate shareholders as compared to
partners.
In 1955, the Tax Court analyzed and discussed incidents of owner-
ship in an insurance policy held by a general partnership in Estate of
187. See I.R.C. §§ 701-777.
188. Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
189. See id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034 (Sept. 21, 1983); see also ZARITSKY,
supra note 43, 8.02[4][b] (indicating that the IRS has not indicated formally whether it will apply
this rule when the insured is only a limited partner).
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Knipp v. Commissioner. 190 In Knipp, the taxpayer was the estate of a
deceased partner, Mr. Knipp.' 9' At the time of his death on November
21, 1947, Mr. Knipp had eleven insurance policies outstanding on his
life, ten of which were assigned to the partnership prior to his death.
192
The partnership owned the policies and Mr. Knipp had no right to change
the beneficiary designation on the policies. 193 The value of each of the
policies was entered on the books of the partnership as an asset and,
thereafter, the partnership pledged the policies as collateral for loans.
194
"The partnership paid the premiums on the policies . . . [and] [t]he in-
crease of cash surrender value of the policies each year was considered
income of the partnership."' 
95
The Commissioner argued that all of the proceeds of the insurance
policy paid to the partnership should be directly included in Mr. Knipp's
gross estate under section 2042 because, as general partner, Mr. Knipp
possessed incidents of ownership in the policies at the time of his
death. 196 The court disagreed, finding that because Mr. Knipp's interest
in the partnership never exceeded fifty percent (50%), the premium pay-
ments were made by the partnership, the insurance proceeds were pay-
able to the partnership, and the policies were assets of the partnership. 1
97
In support of its conclusion, the court found that the partnership had
complete control over the policies and the decedent had no rights in the
policies other than those flowing from his partnership interest.'98 The
Commissioner conceded that the insurance policy was an asset of the
partnership and that Mr. Knipp had no rights in the policies other than
those flowing from his partnership interest. 199 Based upon its finding
that the partnership controlled the policies, the court also found that the
partnership held all incidents of ownership in the policies.20 0 The court
held that the partnership's incidents of ownership in the policies insuring
the life of the decedent were not attributed to the decedent, and the insur-
ance proceeds were not includible in the decedent's gross estate. 20 ' The
aggregate and entity theories of partnership taxation were not explicitly
applied for purposes of attributing incidents of ownership in an insurance
policy owned by the partnership to either the entity or the partners as a
group. However, the outcome of Knipp would appear to be more consis-
190. 25 T.C. 153, 154 (1955), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 6, nonacq., 156-2 C.B. 10, affd on other
grounds, 244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1957).
191. See Knipp, 25 T.C. at 154.
192. Id. at 157.
193. See id. at 168-69.
194. Id. at 157.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 166.
197. See id at 167-68.
198. See id. at 167-69.
199. d. at 168.
200. Id. at 167.
201. Id. at 169.
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tent with the application of an entity theory of partnership taxation where
incidents of ownership are concerned. Further, this outcome comports
with the manner in which corporations and their shareholders are taxed
in relation to the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of a share-
holder.
Like a majority shareholder in a corporation, the court's holding
that Mr. Knipp was not attributed incidents of ownership for purposes of
section 2042 allowed Mr. Knipp's estate to exclude the proceeds in cal-
culating his gross estate. But the holding in Knipp does not allow the
taxpayer's estate to completely escape estate taxation of the insurance
proceeds. Under the circumstances in Knipp, the value of the decedent's
partnership units would appear to increase proportionately due to the
partnership's receipt of the insurance proceeds.20 2 Thus, the holding in
Knipp accords the same treatment to a 50% general partner as the regula-
tions accord to a majority shareholder in a corporation.
Unfortunately, however, the holding in Knipp did not fully resolve
the question of attribution of partnership incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy owned by a partnership. In General Counsel Memoran-
dum 39034 (the "Memorandum"), the IRS analyzed the facts of proposed
Revenue Ruling 83-147 and provided a detailed comparison of the treat-
ment of incidents of ownership between partnerships and corporations.0 3
The Memorandum addressed the facts of the proposed rules whereby C,
D, and E are equal minority general partners of the XYZ partnership.
The XYZ partnership obtained a life insurance policy on the life of D
and designated D's child A as the beneficiary.20 4 Thereafter, the pre-
mium payments were made by the XYZ partnership. 205 The issue for
consideration in the proposed ruling was whether a partner possesses
incidents of ownership as an insured in a life insurance policy held by the
partnership, where the proceeds are payable not to the partnership but,
rather, to a third unrelated party.
206
The IRS first reasoned in the Memorandum that although the facts
involve partnership-owned life insurance, the treatment of corporate-
owned life insurance is relevant .207 Further, the IRS noted that
"[p]artnership-owned life insurance 'could' be given treatment analogous
202. See I.R.C. § 2031(a).
203. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034 (Sept. 21, 1983). By way of a memorandum, dated
December 22, 1981, the Director of the Individual Tax Division of the requested that Chief Counsel
consider two proposed revenue rulings, 83-147 and 83-148, referred to in the G.C.M. as Proposed
Ruling A and Proposed Ruling B, respectively. Id. Ultimately, Proposed Ruling A was published as
Revenue Ruling 83-147. Compare I.R.S. Gen. Courts. Mem. 39, 034 (Sept. 21, 1983), with Rev.
Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
204. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034, at *2.
205. Id.
206. Id. at * 1.
207. Id. at *4.
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to corporate-owned life insurance. ' 08 The Memorandum again points
out that a corporation's incidents of ownership are not attributed to a
"controlling" shareholder where the proceeds are payable to the corpora-
tion.20 9 The Service reasoned that this prevents the proceeds from being
considered both as a factor in valuation of the decedent's stock and as a
separate asset in the decedent's gross estate. 2'0 The IRS noted that this
outcome was specifically intended by the drafters of Regulation section
20.2042-1(c)(6). 1 ' Citing Knipp, the IRS indicated that it acquiesced in
and agreed with the holding in Knipp only where the insurance proceeds
were payable to the partnership and where inclusion of the insurance
proceeds would result in double inclusion of a substantial portion of the
proceeds.
Based upon this reasoning, the Service indicated that it agreed with
the conclusion in the proposed ruling that where:
a partnership owns a life insurance policy on a partner's life and the
proceeds are payable other than to or for the benefit of the partner-
ship, [an] insured partner possesses incidents of ownership in the pol-
icy in conjunction with the other partners, that require direct inclu-
sion of [all] the proceeds in the insured partner's gross estate under
section 2042(2).212
In this regard, the Service noted that the proposed ruling treats "a part-
nership as an aggregate of the individual partners... where the insurance
proceeds" are not payable to the partnership. 2t' As such, the insurance
proceeds are all directly includible in the decedent shareholder's gross
estate under section 2042(2).
For purposes of section 2042(2), the Memorandum indicates that a
partnership is treated "as an aggregate of individual partners. 21 4 Fur-
ther, the Memorandum notes that "incidents of ownership will not be
attributed to partners where the insurance proceeds are payable to or for
the benefit of the partnership. 21 5 Under these circumstances, attribution
of the partnership's incidents of ownership to the insured partner "would
result in double taxation of the. . . proceeds. 21 6 The Service then stated
that its position was to avoid such double inclusion by not including pro-
ceeds payable to the partnership directly in the decedent's estate under
208. Id. at *6 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974)).
209. See id. at *5-6.
210. Id. at *7-8.
211. Id. at *5 (citing Memorandum from Commissioner on Amendment of Estate Tax Regula-
tions (Feb. 28, 1974), 1974 TM LEXIS 84, *1-3).
212. Id. at * 1-2 (emphasis added).
213. See id. at *7.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *7-8.
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section 2042(2).217 Although not specifically stated in the Service's rea-
soning, this conclusion would appear to indicate that where the proceeds
are payable to the partnership, the partnership will be treated as an entity
for federal tax purposes.
Post Cartwright and Blount, based upon Knipp and the Service's
acquiescence to Knipp in the Memorandum, the same concern arises in
the area of partnerships that exists in the corporate arena only to a much
greater degree. The rulings in Cartwright and Blount allow insurance
proceeds received by a corporation to be offset against a perceived obli-
gation on the part of the corporation to redeem an equity interest from
the decedent corporate equity holder. There would appear to be no logi-
cal reason why the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, or any court following
the decisions in Cartwright and Blount, would not apply the same rea-
soning to a redemption by a partnership or LLC of a decedent partner's
or member's interest.
It is true that the Cartwright and Blount courts each based their
holdings on regulations under sections 20.2031-2 which specifically re-
late to valuation of stocks of a corporation.218 However, regulations un-
der section 20.2031-3 address the valuation of interests in businesses and
require taxpayers to determine the fair market value of a partnership in a
manner consistent with the valuation of a corporation. Indeed, the net
value of a partnership is determined on the basis of all relevant factors
including, among other things, the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of
Regulation section 20.2031-2 relating to the valuation of corporate
stock.219
Thus, it would appear that the holding in Blount would equally ap-
ply to a partnership redemption causing a dollar-for-dollar offset of in-
surance proceeds received by a partnership or LLC on a policy insuring
the life of a partner or member against the liability of the partnership or
LLC to redeem a partner or member under a redemption agreement.
ii. Inconsistent Treatment of Minority Partners and Mem-
bers of LLCs Where Insurance Proceeds Payable Out-
side the Partnership or LLC
Importantly, however, the Service went on in the Memorandum to
make a distinction between a controlling shareholder and a partner under
the circumstances of the proposed ruling. The Memorandum indicates
that the proposed ruling takes a different approach than the regulations as
they apply to corporations where the proceeds are payable outside the
217. Id. at *8.
218. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (as amended in 1976).
219. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3(c) (as amended in 1992); see also id. § 20.2031-2(f) (as
amended in 1976).
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partnership. 21° As previously discussed, the regulations under section
2042 provide that if a decedent corporate shareholder owns only a minor-
ity interest in a corporation, no incidents of ownership held by the corpo-
ration are attributable to the decedent shareholder and no proceeds are
directly included in the decedent shareholder's estate. 22' However,
unlike the case of a minority corporate shareholder, the Memorandum
does not apply the same rule allowing the insurance proceeds to escape
estate taxation where decedent is a minority general or limited partner or
a minority member of an LLC.222
In addressing whether incidents of ownership in the policies would
be attributed to the minority general partner, the Service conceded that
partnership-owned life insurance could be given treatment analogous to
corporate-owned life insurance in accordance with the regulations.223
However, if treated the same as a shareholder-corporation arrangement, a
partnership's incidents of ownership would only be attributed to a major-
ity partner where the policy proceeds were payable to a third party.
Whereas a minority partner, in theory, would not be attributed incidents
of ownership.
However, the Memorandum indicates that a general partner insured
under a policy held by a general partnership possesses incidents of own-
ership that are exercisable in conjunction with other general partners.224
This broad statement attributes incidents of ownership in an insurance
policy held by the partnership to any general partner regardless of the
fact that such general partner is a majority or minority interest holder in
the partnership. Such a conclusion would appear to be at odds with the
Tax Court's holding in Knipp. Thus, the IRS appears to have taken a
different approach in the Memorandum based upon the premise that "a
partnership is generally regarded as an aggregate of its individual part-
ners." 225 The Memorandum states that "[a]ny incidents of ownership in
a life insurance policy held by the partnership are [in reality] held by the
partners as individuals. 226 Based upon this reasoning, any policy pro-
ceeds payable to a third party are includible in the insured partner's gross
estate under section 20.2042(2) regardless of whether the partner is a
minority or majority owner of the partnership.227 This conclusion ap-
pears to ignore the notion that "the term 'incidents of ownership' is not
limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in a technical legal
220. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034, at *6-7.
221. Id.
222. See id. at *4-8.
223. Id. at *6.
224. See id. at *7 (citing STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73, 4.14[5][b], available at 1999 WL
1031619).
225. Id. at *7.
226. Id. at *23.
227. Id. at *22-23.
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sense." 228 "Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the
insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. ' 229 Further,
as previously discussed, the conclusion also ignores the provisions under
the regulations that attribute incidents of ownership in a corporate setting
only to a controlling shareholder. 3 ° A minority shareholder of a corpo-
ration is not attributed incidents of ownership under any circumstances
whereas a minority partner is attributed incidents of ownership where the
policy proceeds are payable other than to the partnership.
In light of the above distinction, a question remains in relation to
whether a limited partner or a member of an LLC would be attributed
incidents of ownership in a policy held by the entity. In 2001, the IRS
addressed a fact pattern which included a contribution of an insurance
policy to a limited partnership. In Private Letter Ruling 200111038, two
grantors (A and B) of two separate trusts (Trust A and Trust B) formed a
new limited partnership (LP).23' Trust A was to contribute insurance
policies to LP in exchange for a limited partnership interest.23 2 Trust B
was to contribute cash in exchange for a general partnership interest in
LP.233 Grantors A and B also contributed cash in exchange for a limited
234 teTpartnership interest in LP. Under the LP agreement, all taxable in-
come and losses were to be allocated in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership.235 Further, the agreement provided that gen-
eral partners had sole management authority over the partnership and
limited partners had no right to participate in management or investment
decisions including any decisions in relation to the LP's ownership of the
insurance policies. 236 Importantly, however, the proceeds of the acquired
insurance policies were to be paid to the LP.237
The ruling addressed the issue of whether, for purposes of section
2042, a limited partnership interest would be treated as being sufficient
control such that the limited partners would be treated as possessing in-
cidents of ownership by virtue of their interest in such an entity.238 The
IRS ruled that where the terms of a partnership agreement preclude the
limited partners from exercising any control over the management and
day-to-day affairs of the limited partnership or take part in the vote in
respect to the limited partnership's management and operations, the lim-
ited partners will not possess incidents of ownership under section 2042
228. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1974).
229. Id.
230. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
231. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200111038, at *8 (Dec. 15, 2000).




236. See id. at *9-11.
237. Id. at *10.
238. See id. at *l.
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with respect to insurance policies held by the limited partnership.
239
Thus, in an initial analysis, it would appear that the question turned upon
whether the limited partners (or presumably a non-managing member of
an LLC) had "control" over the policy for purposes of incidents of own-
ership.
However, this line of reasoning loses much of its force due to the
fact that the IRS then fell back on its analysis in Revenue Ruling 83-147.
The IRS indicated that its conclusions were due to the fact that the policy
proceeds were payable directly to the limited partnership and not to a
third party.240 Thus, because the proceeds are payable to the partnership,
the proceeds will increase the value of the decedent limited partner's
interest in the limited partnership and, therefore, no incidents of owner-
ship held by the partnership should be attributed to the decedent limited
partner.241 Even though the reasons given in the ruling address the lack
of the limited partners' control over the policies in relation to section
2042, the fact that the limited partnership received the proceeds makes
the ruling less intriguing and less valuable. Again, the question of how
insurance proceeds on a policy held by a limited partnership or LLC pay-
able to a third party will be treated for purposes of section 2042 specifi-
cally remains unaddressed. Further, the question of whether a partner's
status as a limited partner alone will result in a sufficient lack of control
such that the limited partner will not be attributed incidents of ownership
remains unanswered. If the analysis turned solely on "control," a lim-
ited partner (majority or minority) would not appear to have any inci-
dents of ownership regardless of whether the proceeds were payable to a
third party.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
There are two basic problems in relation to application of the rules
under section 2042 of the Code. First, the Cartwright and Blount deci-
sions allow taxpayers to completely avoid inclusion of insurance pro-
ceeds payable to a corporation where there is a redemption agreement in
place that requires the corporation to redeem a deceased shareholder's
equity interest in the company. Second, the IRS has created an inconsis-
tency in applying the regulations under section 2042 attributing incidents
of ownership in an entity-owned life insurance policy where the policy
proceeds are payable to a third party. The inconsistency results where a
minority limited partner is attributed incidents of ownership while a mi-
nority corporate shareholder is not. Both of these inconsistencies should
be addressed by Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department.
239. See id. at * 19-20.
240. See id. at *18-19.
241. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034, at *7-8.
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Of primary importance is the anomaly created by the Cartwright
and Blount opinions which have created precedent that can be relied
upon by estates of deceased shareholders to support a complete exclusion
of the value of insurance proceeds received by the corporation. This
loophole should be closed. The policy behind the exception to inclusion
provided for in the regulations under section 2042 is premised upon rat-
able inclusion of the proceeds under section 2031. This policy is
thwarted by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Blount and by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Cartwright.
A. Amend Section 2031 Regulations to Require Inclusion of Life Insur-
ance Proceeds in Valuation
One possible solution would be for the IRS to amend the regulations
under section 2031 to clarify that life insurance proceeds payable to or
for the benefit of a company shall, to the extent the proceeds are ex-
cluded by the regulations under section 2042, be included for purposes of
determining the value of the company. Specifically, the fourth full sen-
tence of Regulation section 20.2031-2(f) could be amended to include
following additional language:
In addition to the relevant factors described above, consideration
shall also be given to non-operating assets, including proceeds of life
insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the
extent that such non-operating assets have not been taken into ac-
count in determining the net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend earning capacity. Such non-operating assets shall include,
among other things, proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to or
for the benefit of the company which proceeds have not otherwise
been included in the insured shareholder's estate under section 2042
or the applicable regulations thereunder.
The above amended section of the regulations would clarify that in-
surance proceeds received on the life of an insured shareholder would be
included for purposes of valuing the decedent's stock in the company.
This amendment would require inclusion of the insurance proceeds in an
attempt to prevent an interpretation such as, for example, the interpreta-
tions in Cartwright and Blount, that the insurance proceeds are not the
kind of non-operating asset that should be included in the value of the
company under the regulations. 42 However, the holding in Blount could
continue to create ambiguity because the court's holding also requires
that where a redemption agreement is in effect between the company and
the shareholders, the company's obligation under the agreement should
offset the insurance proceeds "dollar-for-dollar., 243  This second re-
quirement, in effect, would undermine the effect of the proposed
242. See Estate of Blount v. Comr'r., 428 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
243. See id. at 1346.
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amendment by leaving open the question of whether an estate must take
the company's redemption obligation into consideration when valuing a
decedent shareholder's stock.
The requirement that the company's redemption obligation be taken
into consideration by the redeemed shareholder's estate in valuing the
stock for purposes of determining gross estate is inappropriate for several
reasons. First, such a requirement would result in undervaluing the re-
deemed shareholder's stock in virtually every instance due to the fact
that a redeemed shareholder would never concede to selling his or her
shares back for less than an arm's length consideration. Further, valua-
tion based upon post-redemption assets is not arm's length for reasons
explained by the Tax Court in its decision in Blount.244 This portion of
the holding by the Eleventh Circuit would not likely be addressed by the
IRS in regulations but, rather, left to the courts to correct in a later case.
B. Amend Regulations Under Section 2042 to Require Attribution of
Incidents of Ownership to Majority Shareholders, Partners, and
Members of LLCs
Because of the inherent ambiguity in interpreting the court's hold-
ing in Blount, a larger, more expansive change in the Code and Regula-
tions may be appropriate. Accepting the Blount court's holding that the
insurance proceeds should not be included in the valuation calculation, it
may be appropriate for the Treasury to reconsider the requirements of
section 2042 and promulgate regulations that pertain to shareholders,
partners, and members of LLCs that attribute incidents of ownership to a
"controlling" equity holder.
Under current regulations, it appears that the Treasury envisioned
that estates of deceased shareholders of corporations should be required
to include only a ratable portion of the insurance proceeds received by
the corporation. This policy is implemented via the regulations which
prevent attribution of incidents of ownership to a sole or controlling
shareholder where the economic benefits of a life insurance policy on the
life of the shareholder are reserved to the corporation. 24  In turn, this
allows the shareholder to exclude from the gross estate a portion of the
value of the life insurance proceeds notwithstanding that such share-
holder actually had control over the policy.
Historically, inclusion of the insurance proceeds via attribution of
incidents of ownership to a controlling decedent shareholder resulted in a
double inclusion of the proceeds. This outcome resulted because the
value of the corporate shares in the decedent's estate was thought to in-
crease proportionately due to the corporation's receipt of the insurance
244. See id. at 1343-45.
245. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974).
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proceeds. However, under the Cartwright and Blount decisions, the pro-
ceeds are no longer subject to double inclusion due to the fact that the
proceeds are offset dollar-for-dollar by the company's obligation to re-
deem the deceased shareholder's stock.246 Thus, it may be appropriate
for the Treasury to consider whether to amend the current regulations
under section 2042 to provide that a sole or controlling shareholder, part-
ner or member of an LLC will be attributed incidents of ownership where
the equity holder has sufficient ownership interest. This outcome would
appear to be consistent with Congress' intent to impose estate tax on
decedents who have the ability to, for example, change the beneficiary
designation on the policy held by the entity.
C. Amend Regulations to Treat Shareholders, Partners and Members
Consistently with Respect to Attribution Rules
The above problems stem from a set of circumstances wherein the
company receives the proceeds from an insurance policy which insures
the life of an equity holder. A separate and different inequity arises
where the proceeds of a company-owned insurance policy are payable to
a third party. It makes little sense that a minority corporate shareholder
should be treated differently than a minority partner or minority member
of an LLC where the proceeds of an insurance policy are held by the
entity but payable to a third party.
The advent, evolution, and increased popularity of limited liability
companies require that the regulations under section 2042 that apply to
corporations be reassessed in an effort to provide similar treatment to
partners of partnerships and members of LLCs. The general policy be-
hind the section 2042 regulations, directing the proceeds of a corporate-
owned insurance policy payable to a third unrelated party be excluded
from a minority shareholder's gross estate should apply to minority part-
ners, limited partners, and non-managing members of LLCs.
However, the Treasury rulings and agency memorandums indicate
unwillingness on the part of the IRS to treat minority partners and minor-
ity members of LLCs in a similar fashion. Instead, the Treasury views
the partners or LLC members that are treated as partners for tax purposes
as being an aggregate of partners each of whom individually has control
over incidents of ownership of a policy held by the partnership or LLC.
While the general theory of aggregate versus an entity approach to part-
nerships may be relevant to the analysis, there is a very large unad-
dressed grey area between the rights of shareholders and the rights of
limited partners and non-managing members of an LLC. More specifi-
cally, where a limited partnership or LLC agreement authorizes certain
partners or members to manage the assets, including insurance policies,
held by the company, attribution of incidents of ownership to such part-
246. See Estate ofBlount, 428 F.3d at 1346.
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ners or members would be appropriate in that they have actual control.
However, there appear to be many instances in which a limited partner or
non-managing member of an LLC would have little if any control over a
policy owned by the entity. A minority limited partner and a minority
member of an LLC who has no management authority over a company-
held insurance policy would, like a minority shareholder of a corpora-
tion, have no control over such a policy and there would be little reason
to attribute incidents of ownership to such partners or members of an
LLC.
As a result, the Treasury's rulings and memorandums that require a
deceased minority limited partner or deceased minority member of an
LLC to include the whole value of an insurance policy in gross estate
notwithstanding that the proceeds are paid to an unrelated third party are
likely unsupportable and outdated. The Treasury should embark on a
regulation project to analyze and propose amendments to or new regula-
tions which focus on the core control requirement of section 2042. At-
tribution of incidents of ownership should be limited only to those equity
holders of a company that have actual control over the policy or have the
independent ability to control the ownership rights of an insurance policy
held by the company.
IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
Generally, section 2042 requires a decedent who possesses incidents
of ownership in an insurance policy on his or her life to include in the
decedent's gross estate all insurance proceeds receivable under such pol-
icy.247 A decedent possesses incidents of ownership in a policy to the
extent that the decedent can, for example, change the beneficiary desig-
nation or otherwise has rights to the economic benefits of the policy.
248
A sole or majority shareholder has the power to control the beneficiary
designation of a policy owned by the corporation. Thus, a sole or major-
ity shareholder generally would be attributed incidents of ownership in a
corporate-owned insurance policy. However, current regulations under
2042 provide an exception whereby a decedent sole or majority share-
holder will not be attributed incidents of ownership in such a policy
249where the proceeds are payable upon death directly to the corporation.
The purpose of this exception is to prevent the double inclusion of the
value of the insurance proceeds once through section 2042 by attribution
to the majority shareholder via incidents of ownership and again through
an increase in the value of the shares of stock that are required to be in-
cluded in gross estate under section 2031.
247. See I.R.C. § 2042.
248. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1974).
249. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
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In relation to partnerships and limited liability companies, the cases
and rulings have resulted in a similar exception with no attribution of
incidents of ownership to partners or members where proceeds of a pol-
icy insuring the life of a decedent partner or member are payable to the
entity. The Tax Court and the Treasury's rulings are supported by the
same view that to require inclusion under section 2042 would result in
unnecessary double inclusion of the value of the insurance proceeds in
the decedent partner or member's estate.
Until recently, attribution of incidents of ownership and estate taxa-
tion of the receipt of policy proceeds by either an entity or the equity
holder of such entity under the above described circumstances was
largely undisputed under the cases, rulings and regulations. However, in
1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cartwright found that pro-
ceeds received by a corporation from a policy insuring the life of the
corporation's majority shareholder should not increase the value of the
decedent's shares for purposes of determining the decedent's gross es-
tate. 250 The court came to this conclusion based largely upon the fact
that the value of the insurance proceeds was offset by an existing liability
to the decedent shareholder's estate for services performed for the corpo-
ration prior to the decedent's death.25 ' A small portion of the insurance
proceeds received by the corporation were used to redeem the majority
shareholder's stock pursuant to the terms of a stock redemption agree-
ment that existed between the majority shareholder and the corpora-
tion.252 The effect of the court's holding was to allow the shareholder's
estate to completely avoid inclusion of the value of the insurance pro-
ceeds received by the corporation. Ignoring the small portion of the
payment related to the redemption agreement, the outcome of the Cart-
wright case was consistent with the policy behind the estate tax provi-
sions of the Code.
However, in October of 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Blount followed the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Cartwright.
While the court's decision in Blount purports to follow the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cartwright, it appears to misappre-
hend the reasoning of the Tax Court which was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit in Cartwright. By holding that the liability to redeem the shares
of the decedent shareholder operates to offset dollar-for-dollar the insur-
ance proceeds received by the corporation for purposes arriving at the
redemption value of a deceased shareholder's stock, the Blount court
ignores the requirements of section 2042 and the regulations thereunder.
In doing so, the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Blount completely removes the insurance proceeds in determining the
250. See Estate ofCartwright v. Comm'r., 183 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).
251. See Estate of Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1038.
252. Id. at 1035-37.
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value of the shares of the corporation in the decedent shareholder's estate
under section 2031. By removing the insurance proceeds from the calcu-
lation of the value of the decedent shareholder's stock under section
2031, no portion of the insurance proceeds are included in the decedent's
estate.
The exception to inclusion of the proceeds in the regulations under
section 2042 is based upon the premise that the increase in value of the
stock due to the corporation's receipt of the insurance proceeds will re-
sult in a proportionate increase in the value of the corporate stock to be
included in the shareholder decedent's gross estate under section 203 1.253
Consequently, the Blount opinion and the Cartwright opinion to a certain
degree, appear to allow exclusion of the value of the proceeds from the
section 2031 calculation. This, in turn, appears to create an apparent
loophole that allows taxpayers to avoid estate tax payable on proceeds
received from policies where such taxpayers clearly are attributed inci-
dents of ownership. Further, there is no reason why the same anomalous
result would not apply in the redemption of a partner or a member of an
LLC where the entity received the policy proceeds.
In addition to the apparent loophole created by the Cartwright and
Blount opinions, the IRS has created a distinction in the manner in which
minority corporate shareholders and minority partners are treated when a
third party, as opposed to the entity, receives insurance proceeds on the
life of one of the equity holders. In a corporate setting under these cir-
cumstances, a decedent minority shareholder is not attributed incidents of
ownership in the policy held by the corporation. By not attributing the
corporate incidents of ownership to the decedent minority shareholder,
no amount of the insurance proceeds received by the third party is re-
quired to be included in his or her estate. This same rule is not applied to
minority partners or LLC members. Under these same circumstances,
the minority member or partner is attributed incidents of ownership. As
such, the draconian opposite outcome occurs requiring the estate of the
decedent minority partner or member to include all of the value of the
insurance proceeds in gross estate.
Given the widespread implementation of redemption agreements by
shareholders and their closely held entities, there is a need to address the
problems created by the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Blount and the Treasury's disparate treatment of minority corporate
shareholders, minority limited partners and minority members of LLCs.
Several possible solutions exist. First, the Treasury should amend the
regulations to clarify that insurance proceeds received by a company on
the life of a majority equity holder should be included in the equity
holder's estate when valuing the equity interest. Although this outcome
253. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974).
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was intended by the Treasury and is explained in various Treasury pro-
nouncements, the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous that two federal
courts of appeal did not interpret the regulation as it was originally in-
tended to operate.
In the alternative, the Treasury may wish to accept the treatment es-
poused by the courts of appeal and amend the regulations under section
2042 to require attribution of incidents of ownership to majority share-
holders, partners, and members of LLCs. This alternative is in many
ways more consistent with Congress' original intent when it enacted sec-
tion 2042. Whereas, under current regulations, it was the intent of the
Treasury to include only a ratable portion of the proceeds, this alternative
would require majority equity holders in closely held entities to include
in gross estate the whole amount of the insurance. Majority owners of
entities that own insurance policies in fact have control of insurance
policies held by their companies. It is for this reason that this alternative
may be a viable solution.
Finally, the Treasury should equalize the treatment of minority
shareholders with the treatment under the regulations of limited partners
and non-managing members of LLCs. Under current regulations, where
policy proceeds are payable to unrelated third parties outside of the com-
pany, minority shareholders are not attributed incidents of ownership
under the rules. The Treasury's theory behind this treatment is premised
upon the fact that a minority shareholder does not have actual control
over the policy benefits. On the other hand, limited partners and non-
managing members of LLCs are attributed incidents of ownership under
the current rulings. This effectively requires such equity holders to in-
clude all of the policy proceeds in their estates upon their deaths. Such
treatment is unwarranted and must be addressed by the Treasury in a
manner that is consistent with the treatment accorded to corporate minor-
ity shareholders.
[Vol. 84:2
